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"The Momentous Gravity of the State
of Things Now Obtaining":
Annoying Westphalian Objections to the Idea of
Global Governance
TIMOTHY WILLIAM WATERS*
ABSTRACT
Are there situations in which otherwise attractively complex, sub- and cross-national
networks are unlikely to replace the hoary old Westphalian state? Perhaps, but whatever
the answer, global governance as a discipline seems to have a hard time fully considering the
question. One of the problems with operationalizing global governance may be the simul-
taneous profligacy and poverty of the idea itself: its definitional overemphasis on change
and consequent inattention to the state's capacity to reconstitute its core functions and thus
to achieve a predictable continuity. As a result, for all the excellent work done under its
name, global governance as a unifying concept may actually contribute very little, and be
less than the sum of its parts. Thinking about limits is not necessarily skepticism about the
processes that collectively constitute global governance, but a way to give more meaningful
shape to ideas which, as yet, are as problematically defined as they are fashionable.
A POST-WESTPHALIAN MOMENT BETWEEN THE ENTRIE AND DESSERT
Often the most valuable moments at a conference take place away from it-
conversation during the breaks, often over dinner or drinks. So as I cut into my
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steak, or perhaps it was salmon, I listened to a fellow attendee expound on the
ways Argentina is constrained by the changes and forces on which the case for
global governance-the subject of our conference-is built. And then he con-
cluded: "Argentina is just an actor like any other."
I have no metaphysical awe of the Argentine Republic's sovereignty-one of
my earliest political memories is of the Falklands War-but this struck me as
profoundly incorrect. I could think of no corporation, non-governmental organi-
zation, union, or other non-state actor whose capacities come close to those of this
mid-level power.' Yes, Argentina is constrained; it is just one player-a tremen-
dously powerful, resourceful player. And it is not, of course, the only one.
Yet this comment was consistent with ones I heard throughout the confer-
ence-another attendee, for example, predicted the state as we know it would not
be around in fifty years-and would hardly be unprecedented in any discussion
of global governance.2 Statements of faint praise for the power of states-"still
relevant," with the implication "barely" or "but not for long"-suggest that there
already are or soon will be other, more decisive actors. This strikes me as a prob-
lematic position-but more, as one that might indicate something problematic in
the framework out of which such analysis arises, which is to say the framework of
global governance: an orientation, a perspective, and ultimately a self-definition
1. Argentina's GDP is over $520 billion. Its annual budget is $61 billion; a few companies have
larger revenues, but not many. Argentina has an enviable business model, extracting taxes from mil-
lions of individuals and corporate entities without paying taxes on its own enormous holdings. It ad-
ministers a massive array of educational and cultural enterprises. In 1982, it launched a naval invasion
across hundreds of miles of ocean. It has defaulted on its foreign debt five times. Argentina has votes
in the U.N. and international organizations. Admittedly, Argentina is more powerful than most
states, though this only highlights the ambition in calling it "just another actor." See CIA World Fact-
book: Argentina, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/ar.html (last
visited Nov. 8, 2008) (discussing Argentina's economy, government, and military); Argentina's Debt
Restructuring:A Victory by Default?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 5,2005, at 12 (discussing Argentina's $81 billion
debt default in 2001), available at http://www.economist.com/business/displayStory.cfm?story_
id=3715779 (abstract).
2. See, e.g., A. Claire Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International
Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. INT'L STUD. 133, 133 (2001) ("The actors,
structures, and processes identified and theorized as determinative by the dominant approaches to
the study of international law and organization have ceased to be of singular importance."); Susan
Strange, The Declining Authority of States, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER 148, 148-49
(David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2000) ("Today it seems that the heads of governments may
be the last to recognise that they .. .have lost the authority over national societies and economies
that they used to have .... [Tlhe impersonal forces of world markets . . .are now more powerful
than the states to whom ultimate political authority ... is supposed to belong.").
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that privileges proofs of change over continuity, and that is therefore, in some en-
demic way, susceptible to the risks of fahionability.
I was skeptical. Still, I finished my dinner; I sat through the conference. I
enjoyed both: learned a lot and ate well. I am still skeptical.
I. DOES THIS MAKE ME LOOK GLOBAL? A PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION
Every era has its fashions, every decade its fads. These are not trivial; the char-
acter of the times is best remembered by its style. Some fashions-abandoning cor-
sets, adopting casual Fridays-reflect shifts in power and social roles. And taken
together, ephemeral fashions may not only mark but constitute humanity's transfor-
mations. Perhaps we confront such a moment now, when something fashionable
proves foundational, when the trendy resolves into a trendline. Perhaps the idea of
global governance-which is undeniably fashionable 3-is also world-historical.
Certainly global governance, and the changes driving it, merit serious consideration;
as the same text that provides my title notes-admittedly, in a somewhat different
context-"wise men are discussing it; practical men are proposing schemes; popular
meetings, legislatures, and rulers of nations are all busied with it-actually there is
no question which has taken deeper hold on the public mind."4 In the moment, of
course, it is so hard to know. Still, it is all very exciting
Now, a concern with faddishness might seem misplaced: normally we academics
are not famous for being the most fashion-forward members of society. And cer-
tainly, whatever marginal influence a stylish concern with change-for-change's-
sake might have cannot explain the sober and useful conclusions global governance
theorists reach. Few theorists actually believe the state is going to wither away in
favor of disaggregated networks (though as recently as a decade ago, that was an
3. See Benjamin J. Cohen, International Finance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
429, 442 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002) (discussing "the newly fashionable concept of Global
Governance, which over the past decade has attracted increasing attention from IR scholars, particu-
larly in Europe"); Michael Mann, Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?, in
THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note 2, at 136 ("The human sciences seem full of
enthusiasts claiming that a new form of human society is emerging.").
4. His Holiness Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (May 15, 1981), available at http://www.vat
ican.va/holy-father/leo xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf l-xiii-enc- 5051891-rerum-novarum-
en.html ("The momentous gravity of the state of things now obtaining fills every mind with pain-
ful apprehension; wise men are discussing it; practical men are proposing schemes; popular
meetings, legislatures, and rulers of nations are all busied with it-actually there is no question
which has taken deeper hold on the public mind.") [hereinafter Rerum Novarum]; see also infra
note 46.
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easier view to come across)-indeed the great majority either do not think any-
thing of the kind' or perceive a very different trajectory. In fact, I really must take
the awkward step here of stating, as clearly and inartfully as I can, that I am in no
way criticizing the quality and seriousness of writing that goes under the heading
global governance. The articles in this volume are themselves evidence of the
quality, rigor, and thoughtfulness that much of this work evinces; several of these
pieces make real contributions to understanding how components of our shared
local and global communities are constructed and ordered, and one can say the
same about much global governance literature. Indeed, as I will suggest, when a
concept is defined as broadly as global governance is, it would be hard to imagine
that it would not encompass much quality scholarship.
Yet for all the excellent individual contributions, I continue to wonder if there
might not be something joining them that, taken as a whole, merits closer, critical
scrutiny. An orientation towards change, and in particular assumptions about the
state's malleability as an effective governing agent-a malleability often expressed
in the state's relative decline in favor of other sources of legitimacy, authority, and
power-defines the study of global governance, or at least drives us to call the
many different things we are studying by that name. Is there not something risky
in orienting a program of research around the study of change, but not, to the
same degree, of continuity? My concern is directed not at what global governance
theorists have written, but what they have not-at the tendency, discernible in its
definition, that makes global governance (whether as discipline, theory, or con-
cept) in some problematic way less than the sum of its excellent parts.6
In raising concerns about global governance's orientation towards change, I
am not denying that profound changes have occurred in recent decades, the last
century, or last few centuries, changes which can be plausibly labeled "globaliza-
tion." Contacts between individual humans, economic activity across frontiers,
and interactions among states have all increased tremendously, while novel forms
of decision making and participation have arisen (labor unions, non-governmen-
tal organizations, global corporations, democracy, the state itself) and spread
across the globe, unifying and homogenizing political experience. This seems un-
5. That same author who predicted the end of the state as we know it in fifty years notes in his
article, "[h]owever, [that] sharing power does not render states obsolete or impotent." N. Brian Win-
chester, Emerging Global Environmental Governance, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 7, 22 (2009).
6. 1 am speaking about global governance theory in highly general terms, but for a specific pur-
pose: to highlight the ways in which the concept produces, or encourages, a general sensibility or
perspective in its practitioners. It would be impossible, and wrong, to speak of this as a quality affir-
matively attaching to each and every instance of global governance research in some concrete way.
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deniable. The question, though, is does all this indicate fundamental change in
the structures that have regulated human activity in the modern era? Specifically,
does all this prove, or predict, a shift from a system dominated by states to a disag-
gregated model of the kind that global governance appears definitionally to de-
scribe, even if only as the aggregate of many smaller shifts?
As I said, I am skeptical: I think there is a real risk that global governance con-
flates many interesting developments into one theory (whose unifying feature is
change) assigning that theory powers of transformation and justification that it does
not necessarily possess and which we might logically expect it would not. The risk
inherent in global governance as an analytical frame may be the simultaneous prof-
ligacy and poverty of the idea itself: its elastic definition, privileging assumptions
about what the state has been, or might be, reduced to, and a concomitant shortage
of rigorous engagement with evidence of continuity. Skeptical in other words, not
about change, but about its interpretation: does the concept of global governance af-
ford us a robust new mode for understanding of our world, or have we purchased
the intellectual equivalent of a pair of really big sunglasses?7
This little essay suggests three things. First, problems of definition may continue
to plague discussion of global governance even as it moves forthrightly into the fu-
ture. Second, global governance as a theory may overstate the challenges to the state
and the robustness of alternatives, to the degree it overemphasizes the effects of recent
change and fails fully to incorporate predictably sticky elements in states' functional
capacities. And third, this overstatement in turn creates a risk that global governance
as an organizing concept will act more as an aggregator than a generator of insights,
contributing little to the otherwise excellent individual work conducted under its
rubric. But I will only suggest: I do not intend a comprehensive critique, but only to
note some obvious points that the discipline may be structurally inclined to discount.
Thinking about the limits is not necessarily skepticism about all the changes that
constitute global governance, but instead it is a way to give useful shape to a set of
ideas and processes which, as yet, are as inchoate as they may be undeniable.
Finally, this article arises from a conference and makes use of its papers, pre-
sentations, and the found bits of conversation that make any conference valuable.
Such things are hard to footnote, but the kinds of questions that arise from taking
global governance seriously-the obvious critiques that arise the moment one re-
ally does-are going to be asked again, at other conferences, with the quality of a
7. Cf Sarah Sands, Why Do Women Love Bug Eye Sunglasses?, DAILY MAIL, June 15, 2006,available
at http:/Avww.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-390765/Why-women-love-bug-eye-sunglasses.html.
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set piece, even though they are serious, unsettled, annoying, and likely to be so for
as long as global governance remains fashionable.
II. THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE,
AND DEFINING IT AS WE Do
Many scholars have noted problems with defining global governance,' and
that is unsurprising, because global governance-at least the study and discussion
of it-is an enterprise whose contours may best be defined by their elasticity. Cer-
tainly, the range of subjects proffered as instances of global governance-private
lawsuits, satellite consortia, business cartels, constitutional courts, constitutional
design, non-governmental organization activism and accountability mechanisms,
8. Winchester gives an example: "But what is global governance? James N. Rosenau has clearly
framed the question.
Does it refer to a central authority that can exercise control over far-flung situa-
tions on a global scale? Or is it limited to the exercise of authority in particular
situations, such as environmental threats or outbreaks of widespread violence,
which may be global in scope and especially dire? Or does it connote the sum of
all diverse efforts of communities at every level to move towards goals while pre-
serving their coherence from one moment to the next?
Winchester, supra note 5, at 18 (quoting James N. Rosenau, Governance in a New Global Order, in
THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION READER 223, 224 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2d ed.
2003)); see also Klaus Dingwerth & Philipp Pattberg, Global Governance as a Perspective on World
Politics, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 185, 185 (2006) (citations omitted):
In contemporary academic debate about world politics, "global governance" is all
over the place .... Whether it is observable phenomena .. or the ubiquitous
talk about global governance itself, almost any process or structure of politics
beyond the state-regardless of scope, content, or context-has within the last
few years been declared part of a general idea of global governance. What this
idea is about is a question rarely addressed. Instead, most of the works on global
governance stop short of pondering why they are using the newly coined term-
rather than, say, more old-fashioned terms such as international organization or
international politics-and what is implied by its use. On the other hand, those
who do ask, "What is global governance?" are likely to come to the conclusion
that "'Global Governance' appears to be virtually anything."
Id.; Tanja A. B6rzel & Thomas Risse, Public-Private Partnerships: Effective and Legitimate Tools of In-
ternational Governance, in COMPLEX SOVEREIGNTY: RECONSTITUTING POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Edgar Grande & Louis W. Pauly eds., 2005); Elke Krahmann, National,
Regional, and Global Governance: One Phenomenon or Many? 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 323 (2003).
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and pipeline negotiations-confirms either the capaciousness or the cacophony of
global governance.
It is hard to define things. Yet without agreement or a sense of scope, it is not
clear that we are even dealing with a coherent phenomenon, which makes it diffi-
cult to move on to best practices. Still, I think there is a coherent definition of global
governance, though I am not sure it helps make the case for the concept: What best
unites the many instances of global governance, definitionally, is a particular tempo-
ral interpretation-a claim about recent or current change-that in turn may have
consequences for the clarity, robustness, and directionality of research.
"Governance" might be narrowly described as legitimated decision making
and execution.9 But this brings governance uncomfortably close to the word it
clearly mimics and sidesteps," strangling at birth the idea that something other
than a government might have a role in governing. A broader definition-which
better describes the mainstream of the discipline"-captures richness beyond the
formal, 2 but also risks succumbing to its lexical laxity: the soon acts of Parlia-
ment, the peasant risings, the subtle conventions for riding elevators, and the rules
9. Cf. Order in the Jungle, ECONOMIST, Mar. 15, 2008, at 83, 83 (defining governance as "political
accountability and the quality of bureaucracy as well as the rule of law"). The United Nations Devel-
opment Program defines "good governance" as "the responsible exercise of political, economic and
administrative authority in the management of a country's affairs at all levels." Aide Memoire, Inter-
national Conference on Governance for Sustainable Growth and Equity, U.N. Dev. Program, N.Y.,
(July 28-30, 1997), available at http://mirror.undp. org/magnet/icg97/MEMOIR2.HTM. Minus "re-
sponsible," this would presumably define "governance."
10. See COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD: THE REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, at xvi (1995) ("As this report makes clear, global gov-
ernance is not global government.").
11. Id. at 2 ("Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and pri-
vate, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse
interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions
and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and
institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.");seealso Gunther Teubner, Societal
Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional Theory?, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVER-
NANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 3, 16 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004) ("Law-making also takes
place outside the classical sources of international law, in agreements between global players, in private
market regulation by multi-national concerns, internal regulations of international organisations, in-
ter-organisational negotiating systems, world-wide standardisation processes that come about partly in
markets, partly in processes of negotiation among organisations.").
12. See also Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse
Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959) (discussing the shortcomings of formal conceptions
of government); cf. LUNG-CHu CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw: A
POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 14 (1989) (describing the New Haven School's rejection of formalist
analysis of how law works).
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for Kosher meat are all governance. 3 Not that there is anything wrong with that;
like Moli~re's Bourgeois Gentilhomme, you may be delighted to discover you have
been engaged in governance all your life.
Either way, governance, properly considered, is atemporal; it describes a general
theory, reminding us that formal institutions never fully represent human complex-
ity.14 "Global," in turn, suggests a focus on levels either hierarchically above or at
least different from the state.5 But as it is most commonly used in connection with
"governance," "global" introduces a potentially problematic temporal claim. It
would certainly be possible to conceive of "global governance" as an atemporal ana-
lytical approach-a methodological commitment to engaging complexity and
avoiding exclusively statist interpretations-that one could apply at any point in his-
tory.16 Yet despite the availability of such a perspective, what best unites the mem-
bers of the defined set "global governance" is the temporal variant: governance is
changing under conditions of interconnectedness that are happening now.7
13. Cf COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 10, at 2-3 (giving examples ranging
from "a neighborhood cooperative formed to install and maintain a standing water-pipe," a stock
exchange, NGOs, the global capital market, and private associations of beet farmers).
14. See Thomas G. Weiss, Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and
Actual Challenges, in THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE READER 68,68 (Rorden Wilkinson ed., 2005) ('"Gov-
ernance' is now fashionable, but the concept is as old as human history."). "Governance"-minus the
global, but with a domestic focus-has a long pedigree in political science. Dingwerth & Pattberg,
supra note 8, at 188.
15. Cf Dingwerth & Pattberg, supra note 8, at 188. ("[G]lobal can at least refer to two different
spheres-the toplevel scale of human activity or the sum of all scales of activity[.]").
16. So, for example, Rosenau's description of "global governance.. conceived to include systems of
rule at all levels of human activity-from the family to the international organization-in which the
pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions[,]" could plausibly
frame research into such systems in any age. James N. Rosenau, Governance in the Tventy-first Cen-
tury, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 13 (1995),citedin Dingwerth & Pattberg,supra note 8, at 189 n.18. When
I looked, Wikipedia defined "global governance" in fairly atemporal terms as "the political interac-
tion of transnational actors aimed at solving problems that affect more than one state or region when
there is no power of enforcing compliance." Wikipedia, Global Governance, http://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Global-governance (last visited Nov. 8, 2008). Wikipedia is a derivative source, but I
like to use it because it is, in its way, a social analogue for the kinds of challenges and processes
global governance entails. And of course, you can change it.
17. Rosenau, again, defines global governance as "an irreversible process [where] authority is in-
creasingly disaggregated, resulting in a system of global governance that comprises more and more
centres of authority in every corner of the world and at every level of community." Winchester, supra
note 5, at 18. This removes "global" from the atemporally methodological and places it firmly in the
realm of outcome obtained under processes presently (if to Rosenau irreversibly) underway.
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Typical assays at defining global governance-even if they share little else-
frequently share this temporal orientation:' 8
* "a new and as yet undefined global order, characterized in part by porous
borders and power sharing amongst states, non-state actors, and new geo-
graphic and/or functional entities. '" 9
• collective efforts to identify, understand, or address worldwide problems that
go beyond the capacity of individual states to solve.2"
" a "sequel to Westphalia."2'
Despite the observed diffuse character of global governance, we might distill
from these or similar definitions some core themes:
" Problems exist which by their nature require broader or more collective deci-
sion making than the state affords;
* There is an absence of hierarchical structures to address those problems; but
* The evolving responses are complex and systemic in nature;
* Global governance is not simply a new way of understanding the operation
of society. It is a claim that specific changes are happening now;
* This shift represents a new era, in which state sovereignty is altered and
sometimes reduced in favor of a flourishing of sources, authorities and ac-
tors; and
" This new era is not Westphalia.
On this last point: When theorists describe global governance as a systemic
shift, the system they are shifting from is the Westphalian. The remembered
Westphalian system was marked by the factual existence of (and normative sup-
port for) self-legitimating states, whose people and processes were their own con-
cern. Of course, the Westphalian system was much more than apotheosized
18. Here again, as throughout, I am not asserting some specious uniformity among theorists-I
am only speaking of tendencies and implicit commonalities; actual instantiations of theory and pol-
icy may produce highly variable outcomes, and, as I have noted, an atemporal orientation towards the
global is certainly available.
19. Winchester, supra note 5.
20. Wikipedia, supra note 16 (citing THOMAS G. WEiss & RAMESH THAKUR, THE UN AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: AN IDEA AND ITS PROSPECTS (forthcoming 2008)); cf U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECO-
SOC], Comm. of Experts on Pub. Admin., Definition of Basic Concepts and Terminologies in Gover-
nance and Public Administration, 15, U.N. Doc. E/C.16/2006/4 (Jan. 5, 2006), available at http://
unpanl.un. org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan022332.pdf
21. Richard Falk, Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia, 6 J. ETHIcs 311,345 (2002).
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sovereignty and non-interference; with its principle of cuius regio eius religio,22 its
provisions for free commercial traffic, and its norms of conquest, Westphalia was
a model of global governance too-an international system for solving problems
in the absence of global government.23 Nor was Westphalia static; its norms were
refined, abandoned, and accreted from the very beginning, as indeed some global
governance theorists recognize.24 The post-Westphalian world began the day after
Westphalia was signed,25 and the late Westphalian state was far more similar to
our post-Westphalian condition than to its earliest incarnations.26 All this is obvi-
ous enough, and I think most global governance scholarship is fully consistent
with these obvious propositions. Still, even measured analysis that in no way an-
ticipates the disappearance of the state often takes it as evident that "the West-
phalian system" is failing conceptually and even practically, and that global
governance represents its replacement.27 Here we encounter a first consequential
22. This flexible regional norm applied only to Christian sovereigns.
23. Westphalia is ordinarily-and inaccurately-interpreted as the apotheosis of an impenetrable
state sovereignty. On the contrary, by providing express guarantees for the practice of religion within
each state, Westphalia ordered the internal workings of each state by all, while also lifting wartime
trade barriers and navigational restrictions on the Rhine. Treaty of Westphalia arts. LXIX, LXX, &
LXXXIX, Oct. 24, 1648, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th century/westphal.asp. Seegener-
ally Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20 (1948). Westphalia also pre-
served norms of warfare and conquest, which, if one thinks about it, are not conducive to territorial
sovereignty. Full territorial integrity is a product of the post-WWII era and is one reason why the
"intrusive" project of human rights arises at the same time.
24. Cf. Stephen D. Krasner, Compromising Westphalia, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS
READER, supra note 2, at 124, 124-35. "The Westphalian model has never been more than a refer-
ence point or a convention; it has never been some deeply confining structure from which actors
could not escape." Id. at 124.
25. Westphalia is a pastiche: Munster and Osnabriick, signed in 1648, and the Treaty of the Pyre-
nees, signed in 1659. Westphalia's central innovation expanded a religious recognition principle from
the Peace of Augsburg, signed in 1555, and while those who signed MOnster in 1648 contemplated an
eventual Franco-Spanish treaty (mentioned in Articles IV and V), they could not have known it
would take another eleven years. It all sounds so messy and complex, not like "Westphalia" at all.
26. The early Westphalian state: was religious, agricultural, monarchical and feudal; possessed
a minimal state apparatus; lacked concepts such as secularism, separation of powers, professional
bureaucracy, or human rights; and used Latin as a language for system-wide communication.
27. See, e.g., Cutler, supra note 2, at 133 ("Westphalian-inspired notions of state-centricity, posi-
tivist international law, and 'public' definitions of authority are incapable of capturing the signifi-
cance of non-state actors, [like transnational corporations and individuals], informal normative
structures, and private, economic power in the global political economy."); see also SEYOM BROWN,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN A CHANGING GLOBAL SYSTEM: TOWARD A THEORY OF THE WORLD
POLITY 107-18 (2d ed. 1996) (describing incongruities between the state system and developments
in ecology and economics).
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instance of a definition weighted towards change that may exercise a distorting
effect on the broader direction of research.
For now, though, we should simply note this claim of systemic shift, as well as
the frequent identification of global governance with relatively greater mass par-
ticipation; though in some instances global networks may end up strengthening
the state, in many other the process of solving complex, cross-border problems
will also expand participation by individuals, corporations, NGOs, cultural
groups, and other non-state actors. For many scholars, this is a positive enthusi-
asm, a project of political preference and advocacy; for others, it may be a thing to
be guarded against, at least in specific instantiations, such as global jihad or the
rise of multinational corporations. What these all share, though, is a perspective
that privileges evidence of change particularly through moves towards greater
complexity below, above, and between traditional states.28 Several papers at this
conference sounded such themes.2"
With this in mind, I put forward my own assay at what global governance's
self-definition might be:
A broadly-defined array of changes in the distribution of authority,
legitimacy, decision making and participation by individuals and
organizations in ordering human society, in response to similarly
broad changes to material, social, technological, and economic con-
ditions. These changes center on the increasing interconnectedness
and complexity of life and the concomitant inability of the existing
state system (composed of territorially, jurisdictionally, hierarchi-
cally bounded units) adequately to respond. This leads to the for-
mation or legitimation of disaggregated networks of sub- or
cross-state communities as rule-producing and rule-enforcing ac-
tors. Global governance is therefore marked by simultaneous moves
to higher and lower (or more decentralized) levels of functional or-
ganization than traditional states, and toward greater participation
by individuals. The changes leading to global governance have
28. Cf. Dingwerth & Pattberg, supra note 8, at 191 ("In essence, global governance implies a
multiactor perspective on world politics.").
29. See, e.g., Michael Ewing-Chow & Darryl Soh, Pain, Gain, or Shame: The Evolution of Envi-
ronmental Law and the Role of Multinational Corporations, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 195
(2009); Faina Milman-Sivan, Representivity, Civil Society and the EU Social Dialogue, 16 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 311 (2009); Miguel Schor,An Essay on the Emergence of Constitutional Courts,
16 IND. I. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 173 (2009); Winchester, supra note 5.
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been occurring over an indeterminate timeframe at least since in-
dustrialization, more so since the Second World War, and espe-
cially in recent decades. Global governance marks a significant
shift from the Westphalian state-centered governance system.
This definition-which I hope reasonably captures the main themes that global
governance scholarship shares without capturing too much else-places us in a po-
sition to consider the enormous problems inherent in talking about shifts in govern-
ing power: problems in identifying an historical baseline and describing a trajectory.
I think it does this by demonstrating that the otherwise inchoate concept global
governance has a discernible, and therefore contestable, core; the claim at its center
is that, although we have never had a hierarchical global order and have always had
complex systems to create order, problems requiring global coordination have in-
creased and the capacity of states to handle those problems (and thus be positioned
as the exclusive or predominant actors) has not kept pace. Global governance is not
merely a theory about decision making in general; it is a claim that particular, con-
sequential changes are happening now. That is clear enough. Is it true?
III. STILL RELEVANT: LOOKING FORWARD TO LOOKING BACK AT THE STATE
Is the state system undergoing a radical transformation? Is something displacing
its authority? Are there any limits-situations in which otherwise attractively com-
plex, transnational, globalized networks are structurally unlikely to replace the hoary
old Westphalian state? These are questions about the future. As global governance
theorists acknowledge, states wield enormous influence in governance of the globe,"°
but this fact does little to engage the debate, because given its focus on recent, novel
change, global governance may best be understood as a prediction about effects of
globalization that are often only beginning to be fully felt: the fact that only 5 percent
of humanity has ever flown3 or that this is the first year more than half of us live in
cities32 is irrelevant if one discerns the trend.33 I accept that, and move to the question
of interpretation: might the best evidence for global governance be more ambiguous
30. See, e.g., Rosenau, supra note 16, at 13 ("The United Nations system and national governments
are surely central to the conduct of global governance, but they are only part of the full picture.").
31. WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, VITAL SIGNS 2006-2007, at 68 (2006). Given the 1.9 billion flights
taken annually in 2004, that is a lot of repeat customers: I have taken 28 flights this year so far.
32. Burkhard Bilger, The Long Dig, NEW YORKER, Sept. 15, 2008, at 63, 63 (citing U.N. population
figures).
33. 1 do not mean globalization only affects those who travel or live in cities. See infra note 41.
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than it appears? I think the answer is possibly yes. That evidence reveals inconsistent
baselines for claims about change over time and problematic assumptions about the
state that may fail to account for its dynamism-problems, that is, arising out of the
temporal, change-oriented definition of global governance.
A. Do Changes Challenge the State System?
On the standard account, profound changes in social and economic patterns
challenge states' monopoly on governance. But mere change is not enough; it must
be change that demonstrably alters the capacity of the present system of states
(and their regimes) to govern. Consider technology: although some theorists have
supposed that technological change would weaken the state's ability to exert cer-
tain forms of control, 34 states are as likely to gain power from technological change
as they are to lose it. In recent decades, technology has, on balance, enhanced gov-
34. See, e.g., Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF., Jan-Feb. 1997, at 50,51:
The most powerful engine of change in the relative decline of states and the rise of
nonstate actors is the computer and telecommunications revolution, whose deep po-
litical and social consequences have been almost completely ignored. Widely acces-
sible and affordable technology has broken governments' monopoly on the collection
and management of large amounts of information and deprived governments of the
deference they enjoyed because of it. In every sphere of activity, instantaneous access
to information and the ability to put it to use multiplies the number of players who
matter and reduces the number who command great authority. The effect on the
loudest voice-which has been government's-has been the greatest.
By drastically reducing the importance of proximity, the new technologies change
people's perceptions of community. Fax machines, satellite hookups, and the Inter-
net connect people across borders with exponentially growing ease while separating
them from natural and historical associations within nations. In this sense a power-
ful globalizing force, they can also have the opposite effect, amplifying political and
social fragmentation by enabling more and more identities and interests scattered
around the globe to coalesce and thrive.
.... Above all, the information technologies disrupt hierarchies, spreading
power among more people and groups. In drastically lowering the costs of com-
munication, consultation, and coordination, they favor decentralized networks
over other modes of organization .... Governments, on the other hand, are
quintessential hierarchies, wedded to an organizational form incompatible with
all that the new technologies make possible.
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ernment capacity to monitor,35 control,36 and gather information37 on citizens and
corporations in ways a cash and postal economy obscured. Claims that technology
is rendering the state less central to governance also require a sophisticated calcu-
lus to identify the point at which technology began to dismantle, rather than build
up the state; historically it was the technological and social innovation accompa-
nying the Industrial Revolution which made the modern state (with its enormous
powers to tax, keep records, organize military forces, and provide services) both
possible and inevitable.38 When, and under what conditions, would technological
development begin to produce a different effect?
Likewise, the flow of human beings across state frontiers-191 million
35. Most public areas of central London are under closed-circuit television camera surveillance.
George Orwell, Big Brother is Watching Your House, MAIL ON SUN., Apr. 1, 2007, at 22, available at
http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-23391081-details/George+ Orwell,+ Big+ Brother+is+wa
tching+your+house/article.do (noting the average person-presumably in Britain or London-is
caught on camera 300 times daily). The Echelon satellite system allows several states (in a form of
cross-border cooperation) to monitor large streams of international communication. See Federation of
American Scientists Intelligence Resource Program, http://www.fas.org/irp/program/process/ech
elon.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2008) (discussing Echelon system). The Global Earth Observation Sys-
tem of Systems (GEOSS)-mentioned in the conference as an example of global governance-is
perhaps more parsimoniously understood as an instance of cooperation, controlled by states, of a very
familiar kind. See Group on Earth Observations, http://www.earthobservations.org/about-geo.shtml
(last visited Nov. 8, 2008).
36. China has effective technologies for blocking Internet use. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RACE TO
THE BOTTOM: CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN CHINESE INTERNET CENSORSHIP (2006), available at http://
www.hrw.org/reports/20 0 6/chinaO806/index.htm; Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Empiri-
cal Analysis of Internet Filtering in China, IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING, Mar. 2003, at 70, available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/ (more than 50,000 web sites are inaccessible from China);
OpenNet Initiative, Internet Filtering in China, 2004-2005: A Country Study, http://opennet.net/
studies/china/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
37. Recently the United States procured customer information from major telecommunications
companies. Ellen Nakashima, Telecom Firms Helped with Government's Warrantless Wiretaps,
WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2007, at D3, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/08/23/AR2007082302056.html.
38. See, e.g., BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 114, 188-89 (rev. ed. 1991) (noting the role of technology in state develop-
ment); HsI-HUEY LIANG, THE RISE OF MODERN POLICE AND THE EUROPEAN STATE SYSTEM FROM
METTERNICH TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR (2002) (discussing the contributions of nineteenth cen-
tury innovations to the development of modern police); THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN
WESTERN EUROPE (Charles Tilly ed., 1975) (examining the events, processes, preconditions, and devel-
opments contributing to the establishment of powerful national states); CHARLES TILLY, COERCION,
CAPITAL AND EUROPEAN STATES, AD 990-1992, at 100 (1992) (discussing transferability of social in-
novation); Ronald Krebs, Hypotheses on War and Democracy: Clearing Away the Underbrush (Int'l Stud.
Assoc., 2006), http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p98178_index.html (discussing theories about the
relationship between modern warfare and the rise of both the modern states and mass democracy).
ANNOYING WESTPHALIAN OBJECTIONS
migrants,39 another standard proof of changes to which states are ill-equipped to
respond 4°-is 3 percent of the world's population. Even as a trend, it is disappoint-
ing to find the vast majority of people so sedentary.4' For those who do move,
frontiers, immigration rules, and citizenship restrictions are ever-present proofs of
the role states play in ordering human existence.42 It is still true, as Arendt pointed
out, that statelessness is the most debilitating social condition.43 Nor is the present
flow unprecedented; the nineteenth century had higher rates,4 and despite a de-
cades-long wave, the United States (99 percent of whose population is the result of
an enormous migration over the last 516 years) has still not reached the level of
foreign-born population it had prior to 1910 4 5-a date some would identify as a
highwater mark of the Westphalian order.
The fact of change is not itself evidence of relative decline in states' capacity;
an additional act of interpretation is necessary, one that takes seriously the identi-
fication of historical baselines that allow us to consider how unique present levels
39. International Organization for Migration, Global Estimates and Trends, http://www.iom
.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/254/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2008) (citing data from U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council
[ECOSOC], Population Division, Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision (Feb. 2006),
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/migration/UN-Migrant-Stock_
Documentation_2005).
40. See, e.g., Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, The Frontiers of Mobility, in MIGRATION WITHOUT BOR-
DERS: ESSAYS ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE 51, 59-60 (Antoine P~coud & Paul de Guchteneire
eds., 2007) (questioning "the cohesion of the state and its role as the main protagonist in international
relations").
41. An African farmer who never leaves his village is still profoundly affected by global eco-
nomic forces-the "thick" globalization marking the present era. See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph
S. Nye Jr., Introduction, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 7 (Joseph Nye & John D. Dona-
hue eds., 2000) ("'[T]hick' relations of globalization involve many relationships that are intensive
as well as extensive: long-distance flows that are large and continuous, affecting the lives of many
people."). I am only addressing the deployment of population movements themselves as evidence
of challenges to classical governance models.
42. See Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2000);
Catherine Dauvergne, Sovereignty, Migration and the Rule of Law in Global Times, 67 MOD. L. REV.
588, 588 (2004) (arguing that migration controls are the "last bastion" of sovereignty but also that
rule of law norms are constraining states' scope of action).
43. Hannah Arendt, We Refugees, in THE JEWISH WRITINGS 264,273 (Jerome Kohn & Ron H. Feld-
man eds., 2007).
44. Paul Hirst & Grahame Thompson, Globalization and the History of the International Economy,
in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note 2, at 274, 275-76.
45. Sam Roberts, Foreign-born Population Headed for Record in US., Researchers Say, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Feb. 12, 2008, at 6, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/02/12/america/immig.php.
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of change are, if states have responded to similar challenges in the past,4 6 and the
valence changing conditions might have on the governing balance. A global gov-
ernance theory that is, even implicitly, premised on the study of change risks mis-
taking mere change for proof of transformation in the international regime of
governance-and thus becoming a circular proof of its own proposition that
global governance is a meaningful analytical category.
B. Evidence of Actually Existing Global Governance
The case for global governance is based not only on states' diminished relative
capacity but also on the rise of alternatives. Change creates space in which viable
competitors arise: non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multilateral institu-
tions, private law making. As the incredibly broad range of subjects broached at
the conference suggests,47 global governance expresses itself in an incredibly broad
range of ways-so broad, in fact, that it may not describe a coherent claim about
displacement, fragmentation, or reconfiguration of state power across time.
1. NGOs
No field better demonstrates these problematic tendencies than analysis of
NGOs as vectors of cross-national and sub-national governance4 -certainly, "global
46. Cf Rerum Novarum, supra note 4 ("That the spirit of revolutionary change, which has long
been disturbing the nations of the world, should have passed beyond the sphere of politics and made
its influence felt in the cognate sphere of practical economics is not surprising. The elements of the
conflict now raging are unmistakable, in the vast expansion of industrial pursuits and the marvellous
discoveries of science; in the changed relations between masters and workmen; in the enormous for-
tunes of some few individuals, and the utter poverty of the masses; the increased self reliance and
closer mutual combination of the working classes; as also, finally, in the prevailing moral degener-
acy."); His Holiness Pope John Paul 11, Centesimus Annus (May 1, 1991), available at http://www
.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0214/__P2.HTM.
47. I only note a few examples, which neither adequately address the rich diversity of global
governance nor adequately show how those diverse instances proceed from the same problematic
definitional framework.
48. See MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS
IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998) (discussing transnational advocacy networks); Steve Charnovitz,
Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 286
(1997) (discussing NGOs and international governance); Charlotte Ku, Strengthening International
Law's Capacity to Govern Through Multilayered Strategic Partnerships (Center on Law and Globaliza-
tion, Research Paper No. 08-02, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1259215 (examining
multiple layers at which international law functions).
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civil society" was a centerpiece of early global governance claims. 49 One author notes
that global NGOs now account for more expenditure than the U.N., excluding IMF
and World Bank."0 Considering those organizations have a combined budget of just
a few tens of billions of dollars' (funded almost exclusively from state monies 2), this
simply reminds us that the international NGO sector is tiny in comparison with
state outlays, 3 and even that is funded in significant part by governments. 4 More-
over, NGO participation in standard setting or institution building is not necessarily
even governance in any novel sense; translated to the domestic sphere, it would be
readily cognizable as lobbying aimed at pressuring states to act." In his excellent ar-
ticle, Brian Winchester notes that at the 1992 Earth Summit, which ushered in "a
49. Kenneth Anderson, Global Governance: The Problematic Legitimacy Relationship between
Global Civil Society and the United Nations, (Washington College of Law Research Paper, 2008)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cfdev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per-id =235051.
50. Winchester, supra note 5, at 18.
51. Global Policy Forum, UN Finance, http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/index.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 12, 2008) ("The United Nations and all its agencies and funds spend about $20 billion each
year, or about $3 for each of the world's inhabitants."); UNAUSA.org, Fact Sheet: United Nations
Funding (May 2006), http://www.unausa.org/site/pp.asp?c=fvKRI8MPJpF&b =667579/ (noting U.S.
share of funding and arrears).
52. The United Nations does have exciting sidelines in retailing. See Global Policy Forum,
United Nations Children's Fund-Sources of Income, http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/tables/
special/unicef.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2008) (displaying data that shows over 15% of UNICEF's
2003 budget is from "Greeting Cards and Related Operations").
53. Global Policy Forum,supra note 51 (noting that U.N. spending "is a very small sum compared
to most government budgets and it is just a tiny fraction of the world's military spending").
54. See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Ferris, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the International
Refugee Regime, in PROBLEMS OF PROTECTION: THE UNHCR, REFUGEES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 117
(Niklaus Steiner et al. eds., 2003) (discussing growing NGO involvement in refugee protection). See
generally Michael Szporluk, A Frameworkfor Understanding Accountability of International NGOs and
Global Good Governance, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 339 (2009) (discussing criticisms of non-
government based international organizations). Of course, public-private partnerships (with public
funding) are, arguably, a form of global governance-just one that may do less to alter the broader
outlines of statist dominance of the system than might appear.
55. See, e.g., Amy Pollard & Julius Court, How Civil Society Organisations Use Evidence to Influ-
ence Policy Processes: A Literature Review (Overseas Dev. Inst., Working Paper No. 249, 2005).
Although the Ukrainian disability advocates discussed at the conference received international
support, their goals and operating methods were entirely oriented towards lobbying the Ukrainian
state or effecting change in public opinion in the Ukraine. Likewise, the Kimberly Process, raised
in the conference as an example of the "penetration of standards," is assimilable to models of cor-
porate and civic interaction with governments. Winchester notes the limits within which NGOs
continue to operate: "Notwithstanding enhanced influence, non-state actors must still appeal to
states to act, or seek states' approval or at least acquiescence." Winchester supra note 5, at 22. This
seems equally true of such examples as NGO involvement in the creation of the International Crim-
inal Court and the Landmines Convention. Cf Ku, supra note 48, at 116-17. Lobbying is entirely
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new era of global transnational citizen activism that is radically transforming the
landscape of international diplomacy[,j"1 6 accredited delegates (including 114 heads
of state) were outnumbered ten to one by NGO members, farmers, businessmen,
and indigenous people "all of whom were in Rio de Janeiro to lobby delegates and
attempt to influence conference declarations."57 This is fully consistent with models
of participation within the existing state system."8 Yet discourse has long since turned
to NGOs' accountability, 9 as if they already had a significant governance role; this is
true even of the significant literature critical of the rise of NGOs on democratic le-
gitimacy grounds, which raises such criticisms precisely because it accepts the sig-
nificance of the shift. Numerical proliferation-evidence of change-may interfere
with critical analysis of how, precisely, NGOs constitute functional governance in
relation to the state.6" None of this is to diminish the important work performed by
NGOs or the validity of scholarly analysis of that work; it is only to suggest that in-
terpreting this work as governance may not meaningfully describe it or contribute
to our understanding of it.
2. Business Self-Regulation
In many ways, the claim that global business and consumer activists are de-
veloping their own regulatory environment is the most compelling locus for global
governance;" here too, however, the very act of focusing on these actors may draw
attention away from others. So for example, at the conference, the Baku-Tbilisi-
compatible with governance models, of course-my point is, simply, that hardly suggests a novel
shift.
56. Winchester, supra note 5, at 10 (citing Hilary French, Reshaping Global Governance, in STATE
OF THE WORLD 2002, at 187 (Linda Starke ed., 2002)).
57. Winchester, supra note 5, at 10. But see Mathews, supra note 34, at 55 (noting that "[tihe tiny
nation of Vanuatu turned its delegation over to an NGO ... making itself and the other sea-level
island states major players in the fight to control global warming").
58. Mann, supra note 3, at 144 (Activists "use emerging global networks of communication and
NGOs, and they focus energies on the UN as well as their own state. However, most contending ac-
tors demand more regulation by their own nation-state through its legal or welfare agencies.
59. See Szporluk, supra note 54, at 349 (discussing accountability issues).
60. Cf ANTONIO GRAMSCI, PRISON NOTEBOOKS (1992) (discussing cultural hegemony and civil so-
ciety's interrelationship with the state); JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF
THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (1989) (discussing the
concept of a public sphere); KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (1945) (discussing the
function of civil society).
61. See, e.g., Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements, and the Rise
of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Fields, 31 POL. & Soc'Y 433 (2003); Errol
Meidinger, Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation: How Could It Be Democratic? 8 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 513 (2008).
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Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline was presented as an instance of corporations taking a
leading role in structuring states' legal regimes. In a deal with a British Petro-
leum-led consortium, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey agreed to enforce legal
regimes whose evolution they did not control and signed on to supervisory pro-
cesses like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. 62 It is quite a story:
the corporation as lawmaker more sovereign than the state, now figuring as "just
another player" and not the decisive one.
But someone taking even a cursory glance at a map might wonder at the curi-
ous route of BTC. Owing to the impasse over Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia's
frontiers with Azerbaijan and Turkey are closed, so the pipeline had to be routed
over Georgia. There is a shorter route through Iran, but this is unacceptable to the
United States. Georgia's littoral is closer still, but Turkey insisted tankers not sail
through Istanbul 61 and diverted the pipeline to the Mediterranean, which entitles
it to billions of dollars in transit fees. BP's consortium was not powerless, but its
investment was determined by classic geostrategic concerns. The only reason BTC
got built at all is that the United States pressed for a route to break the Russian
and Iranian lock on transshipment of Central Asian oil; business decisions alone
cannot explain BTC's route, or even its existence. The consortium is like a ship
struggling to chart a course through rough seas: a savvy captain can steer his ves-
sel safely through and even turn a profit, but it is a foolish captain who forgets,
even for a moment, where he is, or who sails straight into the storm.64
Unquestionably global economic forces are in flux, and corporate networks exert
enormous influence on their own regulatory environment, but this merely returns us
to the question of baselines: when have states ever had control of their economic des-
tinies? The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were marked by depressions on
a pan-European or global scale,6 while within and across given economies, the larg-
est companies were enormously influential. When one recalls the enormous foreign
investments of the Westphalian past, their interconnection with geopolitics-the
62. Cf Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, http://eitransparency.org (last visited Oct. 4,
2008). Only Azerbaijan is a Candidate Country under the process.
63. See Bahman Aghai Diba, Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline: The Biggest Development In the Caspian Sea
Since the Collapse of USSR, Sept. 17, 2002, http://www.payvand.com/news/02/sep/1060.html; Azerb
.com, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, http://www.azerb.com/az-btc.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2008).
There are real environmental and commercial concerns, but the point is that Turkey's interpretation
proved decisive.
64. Cf Anderson,supra note 49, at 37 ("[T]he global order that the superpower underpins is the
one in which the NGOs swim as fishes in the sea.").
65. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, THE COURSE AND PHASES OF THE WORLD-ECONOMIC DEPRESSION
274-98 (1931).
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Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, the
Suez Canal, United Fruit-and the ambiguous position this put minor powers in,
one wonders why exactly we think that state-corporate interactions like BTC are
fundamentally different;66 why, that is, that they suggest the state is weakening, rather
than that there have always been strong and weak states, both in the Westphalian
past and today. Indeed, if one considers the extraordinary rise in the power of the
state since the early nineteenth century-the increase in its tax base, bureaucracy,
and responsibilities-it is possible that the contemporary state has more control over
the economy than its notionally more sovereign counterpart.6
7
True, we are several decades into a shift from dirigisme toward free-market
liberalization, which logically tracks with diminution of state control and a rise in
horizontal regulation by business and capital markets; this recommends an inter-
pretative frame open to the possibility that this is a correction. 68 States retain enor-
mous authority to regulate and define business both within and between their
jurisdictions, and there may be predictable limits to any shift. Development the-
ory suggests the fundamental importance of clear norms about property and con-
tract, which may imply decisional hierarchy69 and thus a minimum state function,
which markets may find difficult to substitute.
66. The economic interpenetration of the industrial powers prior to the First World War is axiom-
atic. Cf NORMAN ANGELL, THE GREAT ILLUSION (1913) (discussing economic interpenetration and its
pacific effects); Hirst & Thompson, supra note 44, at 274-86. The standard turn-as with NGOs-is
to emphasize the unprecedented (and undeniable) quantitative growth. See Matthews, supra note 34,
at 52 ("Today's powerful nonstate actors are not without precedent. The British East India Company
ran a subcontinent, and a few influential NGOs go back more than a century. But these are exceptions.
Both in numbers and in impact, nonstate actors have never before approached their current strength.
And a still larger role likely lies ahead.") Thus, discussing Angell's thesis, one participant in the confer-
ence suggested the vastly greater volume and speed of trade today is the decisive difference. I am not
competent to evaluate this entirely sensible suggestion, though I gather the whole point of the distinc-
tion-apart from its possible truth-is that as a percentage of total trade, the present levels of transna-
tional commerce are not unprecedented, and were last achieved in an era we identify with strong state
sovereignty. (Note too, in Matthews, the element of prediction.)
67. I mean more control in terms consistent with classical theory of the sovereign state, and not
solely by virtue of participation in international institutions in the way theorists like Raustiala
argue, though these effects may also be occurring. See Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty
Debate in International Economic Law, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 841 (2003).
68. Calls for increased state regulation in response to the financial crisis may signal the end of
this period.
69. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000). Recent responses to the financial crisis suggest
that self-regulation has not displaced pervasive state regulation (including inter-state cooperation)
in shaping markets.
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These are problems of time. It may be, in other words, that global governance
theory as formulated has disinclined its students to sufficient study of historical
and theoretical evidence for the strengthening of the state over time which a full
embrace of a more atemporal idea of global governance would recommend. Dif-
ficulty accounting for the possibility of predictable limits is but one consequence
of an definitional frame biased toward indicia of novelty. It is not clear if the
changes underlying proofs of global governance have occurred only recently-
since the Second World War and especially in the last three decades 7-or are a
process that roughly tracks the modern era,7' a timeframe that includes the rise of
the state itself.
3. Supranationalism
Lurking behind many global governance claims is the European Union-
undoubted proof of post-national, post-sovereignty governance.72 Arguably,
though, the soft-power experiments of the EU present little challenge to the state
system, and instead point to a conceptual problem with the theory's definition; the
EU is not a governance organ in the broad sense, but in the narrow one-a kind
of government. As the EU acquires the powers of states, it becomes more state-
like-accreting constitutions, elected bodies, fiscal powers, regulatory authority,
and a foreign policy. The forging of a "state-like" EU coexisting and overlapping
with traditional states would (already does) constitute a novel, world-historical
realignment of power that richly deserves to be studied-but it would also be in
many ways a state, perhaps best understood as consolidated, rationalized West-
phalianism. This may be a general problem with the approach to power in theo-
ries of global governance-especially, perhaps, theories of network
disaggregation-which seldom articulate how, once meaningful power is trans-
70. See generally TAGi SAGAFI-NEJAD, THE UN AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: FROM CODE
OF CONDUCT TO GLOBAL COMPACT (forthcoming 2008) (discussing the advent of globalization in
the 1980s).
71. Mark W. Zacher, The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International
Order and Governance, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD
POLITICS 58,59 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992) ("[The growth of international
cooperation] is a process whose roots can be traced back at least to the beginning of the industrial
revolution, but it has only been since 1945 that it has accelerated so as to have a marked effect on the
international order."); Globalization, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (rev. ed. 2006), http://
plato.stan ford.edu/entries/globalization/.
72. See, e.g., Christopher J. Borgen, Whose Public, Whose Order? Imperium, Region, and Norma-
tive Friction, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 331 (2007). At this conference, Professor Milman-Sivan discussed
the European Union's governance role.
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ferred into non-state actors' hands (or to networks of states and supranational in-
stitutions), they will not discover incentives to preserve and expand that power
which may, in effect, convert them into state-like entities themselves.73 Such
changes would still be consequential, but better accounting for Westphalian con-
tinuities would move global governance theory toward a less expansive, though no
less important interpretation of real change.
C. The Thinness and Directionality of Global Governance's Evidence
These examples, few and incomplete as they are, are also perhaps hopelessly
substantive, and my point is not to contest the fact of shifts in power (and certainly
not the fact of change), but to suggest imbalances that may arise out of the nature of
the project. I think these have to do with the interpretative frame: the most prob-
lematic element of global governance theory may be its starting point that the mod-
ern state is in significant transition under pressure from an array of mechanisms and
processes. The proffered evidence suggests real problems with identifying the time-
frame in which to make claims about such changes and with identifying them as
challenges. If global governance is a recent phenomenon, how do we explain the oc-
currence of disaggregated non-state action in earlier eras? 4 If global governance is
occurring over centuries, then why are the evolving state apparatus and interstate
system not themselves a robust response to those changes? Evidence of actual exist-
73. Cf. Rosenau,supra note 8, cited in Winchester, supra note 5, at 18 (referring to the "increasing"
and "irreversible" disaggregation of authority). But what if it is the nature of power to aggregate it-
self? Much political philosophy and human history support the proposition that actors and institu-
tions tend to accumulate power. See TILLY, supra note 38 (discussing dominance by coercive and
capital-holding elements in competition for control of state); cf. Lord Acton, Letter to Bishop Mandell
Creighton, in LIFE AND LETTERS OF MANDELL CREIGHTON 371-72 (Glehn Creighton & Louis Creigh-
ton eds., 1906). In contradistinction, global governance may prove too optimistic about the capacity
for disaggregated networks-which are supposed to arise and reform functionally-to perform de-
fined governance tasks without adopting a power logic. It may be, in other words, that disaggegrated
network theory does not describe a stable equilibrium, but only a mechanism of transfer between
equilibria. The new actors might not be states-they might be a new Hanseatic League, non-territo-
rial actors, institutions, cartels-but to the degree their interests competed with other states, they
might find it necessary, in defending those interests, to compete directly with states and in effect
displace them by becoming them. (This logic explains the rapid spread of the modern, European
state model under industrialism and decolonization, for example.) The point, however, is that global
governance theory, having incorporated assumptions about change and often disaggregation into the
definitional heart of the model, may not be conceptually equipped to consider this objection.
74. Cf. Anderson, supra note 49, at 4-8 (identifying abiding instances of inherently transborder,
non-state actors interacting with the ruler in the Western Christian tradition, though noting also
their profound differences from modern NGOs).
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ing global governance can be as thin and imbalanced as its definition is expansive
and unrestrained, relying on the observation that more NGOs, multinational cor-
porations, institutions and networks exist-that change is happening-and the in-
vocation of speculative trajectories. Focused as it is on processes of change-and
often on non-state actors-global governance may be conceptually inattentive to
evidence of the state's capacity for dynamic reconstitution. 7
I am not defending a monolithic State. The insight that states are social con-
structs teeming with disparate and contesting elements is not new;7" states and the
state system are complex, and always have been. That is the point: even in the high
Westphalian moment, whenever that was, states were not monolithic actors, but
complex, internally contradictory, teeming multiplicities with overlapping affilia-
tions that reached outside borders to like-minded actors inside other supposedly
sovereign units.7 7 But if the state never was a centralized, unitary creature, there is
no necessary reason to interpret present proofs of heterogeneity or dynamic re-
sponse as a relative decline in state power or a novel disaggregation. This continu-
ing plurality and multiplicity does not necessarily change the social reality of the
constructed state as an actor fulfilling identifiable functions-some of which may,
even as they change in their particulars, reflect a patterned maintenance of certain
governance functions: a core state.
78
D. The Most Annoying Question: Is There an Irreducible State?
Rather than replicate an imbalanced definitional logic, the most comprehen-
sive research explores the balance between "governance by government" and
"other governance" by asking if there are any irreducible or sticky elements of the
75. Dynamic change in response to environmental shifts can produce the functional equivalent
of stasis-the maintenance of a stable set of relationships to other actors.
76. See, e.g., ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL PRESSURES
(Belknap Press 1967) (1908); Nicholas Lemann, Conflict of Interests, NEW YORKER, Aug. 11, 2008,
at 86 (discussing BENTLEY).
77. Certainly, global governance theorists recognize this. See generally K.J. Holsti, Governance
Without Government: Polyarchy in Nineteenth-Century European International Politics, in GOVER-
NANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT, supra note 71, at 30, 57 (discussing complex governance in the
nineteenth century).
78. Cf Raustiala, supra note 67, at 843 (discussing sovereignty-strengthening functions of inter-
national institutions, and calling this "a line of thinking that rejects the dominant thinking on
sovereignty and institutions").
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state.79 This seems intuitively plausible: states have proven considerably more du-
rable phenomena than most private organizations (other than religions). 0 A
"Westphalian continuity corollary" would suggest that a) even in conditions of
dynamic change, b) states demonstrate persistent, possibly irreducible powers, c)
which may be necessary functions under international conditions of anarchy.
Are there irreducible functions of the state under present conditions?8' From at
least the late Westphalian phase after industrialization, state-like entities82 generally:
" exercise (near-) monopolies of violence;
" control taxation, defense, basic security and citizenship policy;
" operate formally legitimated adjudicative, legislative, and executive organs;
" exercise near-exclusive decisional access to international institutions;83
* are both major property owners and property rule makers;
* are both major market players and market regulators; and
" possess relatively captive labor and consumer pools.84
In addition, many states have populations that, rationally or otherwise, are will-
ing to die or kill for the state project. This list is too long to be a true minimum" -
there are many states that do not fulfill these criteria-but functions related to
79. For example, Slaughter acknowledges that only states can provide certain forms of legiti-
macy. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
80. Hosti,supra note 77, at 31 ("In terms of endurance, the state is far safer than is a typical busi-
ness firm."). Argentina, for example, was launched as an independent enterprise in 1816 and has
been operating continuously ever since.
81. Obviously the state is not essentially irreducible, since there were times in recorded history when
states did not even exist in anything like the form we now know. I restrict myself to conditions of com-
plex, industrialized societies with communications and trade networks-conditions likely to persist.
82. That is, organized political entities controlling a territory and population. Cf Convention on
the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933,49 Stat. 3097, Treaty Series 881, http://avalon.law.yale
.edu/20thcentury/intamO3.asp. An overly narrow definition of the state-one that might exclude,
say, historic Saxony because it was part of a larger unit called the Holy Roman Empire, despite its
having its own government and military-does not strike me as terribly useful. My conception and the
following list are influenced by MAX WEBER, POLITICS AS A VOCATION (1919).
83. Milman-Sivan,supra note 29, reminds us that the International Labour Organization is almost
unique in having non-state representatives in its governance, and even these are appointed by the states.
Constitution of the International Labour Organization art. 3.5, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/
english/constq.htm. (Some human rights treaty commission members serve in a personal capacity;
they are also appointees.)
84. See Dauvergne,supra note 42, at 588 (calling migration controls "last bastion" of sovereignty).
This is not the case for production and capital, which are much more mobile than human popula-
tions.
85. There is no reason to think labor markets must be as restricted as they now are, for example.
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defense, basic security, taxation, citizenship policy and even-though it goes to the
very heart of global governance-maintenance of basic legal and government struc-
tures are a plausible minimum.86 As much global governance literature acknowl-
edges explicitly or implicitly,87 there is little evidence that states are surrendering
these core functions,"8 or even disaggregating them" in any way that meaningfully
limits the role of states to act individually or in concert qua states-that is, as they
long have. Moreover, there may be a categorical displacement effect. Some state-like
entity exercises these powers almost everywhere-not because it is normatively
good, but because some entity inevitably will, and that entity, by virtue of perform-
ing those functions, takes on the qualities we associate with the state9 Even this
short list would constitute a powerful limit on the scope of global governance, esp-
cially if the effectuation of these minima continued to create the kind of gravita-
tional effect on other functions as it did in the nineteenth century.9'
86. This is the classical liberal "night watchman state." Cf ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA 26 (1974). 1 am not justifying a minimal state, rather suggesting it is a predictable
minimal limit. Cf. Anderson, supra note 49, at 37 ("The cause of global governance, and partner-
ship with global civil society, looks much less attractive when security itself is an issue."); Strange,
supra note 2, at 149 ("The need for a political authority of some kind, legitimated either by coercive
force or by popular consent, or more often by a combination of the two, is the fundamental reason
for the state's existence. But many states are coming to be deficient in these fundamentals.").
87. A relative lack of global governance research on these core functions could constitute implicit
acknowledgement that they are not areas as readily subject to a change logic.
88. But see Strange, supra note 2, at 149 (Declining state power "is less effective on those basic mat-
ters that the market, left to itself, has never been able to provide-security against violence, stable
money for trade and investment, a clear system of law and the means to enforce it, and a sufficiency
of public goods like drains, water supplies, infrastructures for transport and communications.").
89. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 183, 184
("The state is not disappearing, it is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts. These
parts-courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures-are networking with their
counterparts abroad, creating a dense network of relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmen-
tal order."). Slaughter's networks have real effects (including the strengthening of states' sover-
eignty, as Raustiala argues), but few of them go to the core functions of the state. Nor has the
"competing notion of'human security ... creeping around the edges of official thinking" created
meaningful inroads in state functions. Mathews, supra note 34, at 51.
90. Cf. Jennifer Hyndman, Conflict, Citizenship, and Human Security: Geographies of Protection, in
WAR, CITIZENSHIP, TERRITORY (Deborah Cowen & Emily Gilbert eds., 2007) (discussing security as
the core good provided by the state). In some places the state fails dramatically to provide even these
minima. We call those places "failed states," and it is an interesting question whether the existence of
such places-and the fact that we interpret them as "failed"-argues for or against global gover-
nance as a predictive model, at least with reference to the many "functioning" states.
91. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 38; STANFORD J. SHAW & EZEL KURAL SHAW, II HISTORY
OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY (1977) (describing interaction of military and
Tanzimat reforms); THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 35.
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 16:1
This list is rough but not arbitrary; it is rationally related to human security in a
world that lacks hierarchical ordering. The cosmopolitan fantasy of a post-West-
phalian non-territoriality brunts up against the fact of humans' physicality, and their
consequent, irreducible need to organize themselves on territory-the Hobbesian
foundation of security and Maslowian heart of any governance project. 2 Anarchy is
not a Westphalian condition, but a given in all conditions short of global govern-
ment; two or more bounded states create horizontality between them, which rein-
forces the need for local hierarchical structures to secure and govern the space and
protect the people within, including their ability to reach out and interact.93
And as we have seen, beyond this minimum, during the timeframes most
commonly proposed for global governance, states have acquired an extraordinary
range of additional powers to regulate, redistribute, and coordinate among them-
selves, often in direct, dynamic response to changes in the broader socioeconomic
environment-as, for example, in the nineteenth and early twentieth century,
when increased mobility and passport regimes developed in parallel. Thus we
confront an image of the state with a predictable, functional core, and a contin-
gent but expansive set of powers around it. Such a view renders the state resilient,
not static, able to mobilize and master changing resources, able to reinvent and
redeploy itself.9 4 A Westphalian sensibility-the view that the state is an inevitable
(not necessarily desirable) constructive consequence of large-scale populations liv-
ing in conditions of anarchy-is necessarily skeptical about any project that does
not adequately account for such possibilities.
92. Cf. Mann,supra note 3, at 136 ("State institutions, both domestic and geopolitical, still have
causal efficacy because they too ... provide necessary conditions for social existence: the regulation
of aspects of social life which are distinctively 'territorially centred."').
93. BROWN, supra note 21, at 22-23; cf. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF
ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 13 (1977) (noting that in anarchical international society states are "bound
by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common
institutions"); see Friedrich Kratchowil, Preface, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: A READER, at ix, x
(Friedrich Kratochwil & Edward D. Mansfield eds., 1994) (noting "two distinct meanings. The tech-
nical meaning concerns the absence of central institutions .... But we also use the concept of anarchy
to characterize a situation in which order itself is lacking .. .which comes close to the Hobbesian 'war
of all against all[,].' and noting the two meanings' incompatibility.) I align my observations with the
technical meaning, consistent with Bull's: anarchy is not chaos or disorder.
94. Consider the response of European states to the challenge of international socialism-transfor-
mations such as centralized industrial planning, welfare policies, and broadened franchise-that left
the state apparatus stronger than it had been, as well as more democratic. Nick Knight, Applying
Marxism to Asian Conditions, in TWENTIETH-CENTURY MARXISM 141, 142-43 (Daryl Glaser & David
M. Walker eds., 2007); JAY A. WEINSTEIN, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHANGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE FOR A
DYNAMIC WORLD 272, 274-75, 277-78 (2d ed. 2005).
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Of course, global governance is to some extent constructed in contradistinc-
tion to traditions in political science and international relations that emphasize
anarchy and a focus on states. 5 To the degree global governance is simply an anti-
dote to a Walzian reductivism"6 or formalist legal analysis of the sovereign State,97
it is both welcome and, I would have thought, redundant. The standard defense
of the "billiard-ball" approach to theorizing international relations-the need for
parsimony in theory-seems unsatisfying: accounting for complexity does indeed
render theory more complex, but that is an acceptable price.9 Still, in its quest for
a more accurate complexity, global governance as theory risks substituting one
simplification for another. By organizing and conceptualizing itself in opposition
to state-centered anarchic theories of international relations and emphasizing the
role of non-state actors, global governance risks overcompensating, discounting
the meaningful contribution that theories of anarchy-which are generally
staticg-make to our understanding.
One might well disagree with an interpretation relying on principles of anar-
chy, but global governance should have some theory of the minimal state. Asking
about predictable minima is not essentialist, especially if by doing so we mean no
more than to provide balance to the observation that change is always occurring and
that the transit times for goods, people, and ideas have been reduced, which tells us
nothing about their relationship to political entities that are themselves dynamically
responsive. Recognizing that a predictable set of functions attach to the state-that
95. See, e.g., Benedicte Bull et al., Private Sector Influence in the Multilateral System: A Changing
Structure of World Governance? 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 481 (2004) (adopting a neo-Gramscian
critique of international relations theory).
96. Cf KENNETH N. WALZ, A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979).
97. Cf HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 129 (Stevens & Sons 1904) (1836)
("Every nation possesses and exercises exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction throughout the full
extent of its territory .... 'No state can, by its laws, directly affect, bind, or regulate property be-
yond its own territory, or control persons that do not reside within it, whether they be native-born
subjects or not."').
98. Cf Friedrich Kratchowil, Structures and Transformations, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION,
supra note 93, at 325, 325 ("By displacing power...from its central place in a theory of international
politics, subsequent theorizing could become less parsimonious and elegant. But...the ideal of parsi-
mony in theory building can prove doubly debilitating if not pursued with extreme caution.").
99. See Edward D. Mansfield, The Organization of International Relations, in INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION, supra note 93, at 1, 2 ("[M]any studies of international relations argue that the
underlying features of the international system have been much the same over time. They main-
tain that, at least in modern times, the global arena has been characterized by anarchy[,]" but
critiquing such approaches as being insufficiently complex.).
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whatever exercises those functions will be something like a state-helps pragmati-
cally shape predictions about the spread, and limit, of global governance.
Quite simply, theory must more adequately consider the possibility, not only
of change but also of continuity. Global governance-definitionally oriented to
the study of complex change and to the belief that there is not a central set of ac-
tors' 0 0-may privilege assumptions which, right or not, color researchers' choice of sub-
ject, research design, and conclusions, and thus risks succumbing to the combination
of profligacy and poverty inherent in its definition, reaching inaccurate conclu-
sions that may overemphasize the significance of socioeconomic changes and un-
deremphasize the state's resilient centrality in the global governance regime.
IV. CHANGE WE BELIEVE IN:
THE EXUBERANT STYLE IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Given that a serviceable, balanced atemporal definition of global governance
is available that might avoid these risks, what accounts for the persistence of the
temporal version?
Though its antecedents extend back farther, global governance as a discipline
was largely constructed in the 1990s 1 5-a period following the end of the Cold
War that also saw the End of History, a New World Order, unipolarity, and the
"irrational exuberance" of a New Economy. 02 Appropriately, in a chronological if
not intellectual sense, there was a greater than usual florescence of millennialism
in those days. And indeed, within global governance, one can discern a phase in
100. Cf Dingwerth & Pattberg, supra note 8, at 192 ("[T]he notion of global governance starts
from the assumption that a wide variety of forms of governance exist next to each other and that a
hierarchy among these various mechanisms is hard, if not impossible, to discern: 'There is no sin-
gle organizing principle on which global governance rests, no emergent order around which com-
munities and nations are likely to converge. Global governance is the sum of myriad-literally
millions of-control mechanisms driven by different histories, goals, structures, and processes ....
In terms of governance, the world is too disaggregated for grand logics that postulate a measure of
global coherence."'). Obviously, many global governance scholars acknowledge the important,
even central role of the state-I speak only of a tendency.
101. See generally Anderson,supra note 49 (providing a periodization of global governance).
102. The internet was not only going to create a new economy, but a new concept of citizenship.
Today, earnest "declarations of the rights of netizens," though a derivative species of global gover-
nance, frankly sound embarrassing. See, e.g., Michael Hauben & Ronda Hauben, Netizens: On the
History and Impact of Usenet and the Internet, FIRST MON., July 6, 1998, http://firstmonday.org/htbin/
cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/605/526; The Netizen Declaration of Citizenship (Oct. 29,
2004), http://linux.derkeiler.com/Newsgroups/alt.linux/2004-10/0674.html; Caslon Analytics Guide:
Cyberspace Governance, Netizens ? (Sept. 2007), http://www.caslon.com.au/governanceguidel l.htm.
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which what was thought to be happening was not merely the proliferation of ac-
tors but the actual, absolute decline of the state.' 3
An intellectual movement is not defined by its origins, and global governance's
center of gravity has shifted considerably. Indeed, part of the narrative self-identifi-
cation of global governance as a field is, precisely, that it has moved on from this
early, immature phase to embrace more grounded, technical analysis, including
subfields whose work leads to very different conclusions about governance and the
state.1°4 On this reading, global governance as a discipline seems to demonstrate,
through its own temporal narrative, that it is decidedly, correctly unconcerned with
passing intellectual fashions. I hope so, but I am skeptical about this narrative, in
particular about the effects on perspective that come from forming, in the present
moment, opinions about how far we actually are removed from our own past.
There is a general tendency, in people and their institutions, to overstate the
relevance and meaning of recent and proximate things. This is evident, for ex-
ample, in the tendency of general histories to devote much more text to recent
than to distant events, but also in Freud's narcissism of small differences' 5 and in
moral philosophy. 6 Mere currency or salience does not actually imply greater im-
portance, of course-this is logically insupportable-and indeed the vicissitudes
of recent events flatten out in memory and analysis with the passage of time; shifts
that feel world-historical inevitably, in the rush of other equally world-historical
events, acquire a different, more tempered perspectival patina. This does not
mean there are no epochal changes, no moments of rupture; it is simply that we
103. See Anderson,supra note 49, 12-27 (discussing the period 1989-1996 and 1996-2000);see, e.g.,
SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996); Christopher
Schreur, The Waning of the Sovereign State, 4 EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 447 (1993).
104. Anderson, supra note 49, at 35-36 ("[A] new and intellectually powerful assortment of scholars
- impeccably liberal internationalist, wedded to global governance, but not at all wedded to the sanc-
tity of global civil society - has already moved beyond the idea that global governance can or should be
sought through global civil society. They are almost certainly right in viewing the global civil society
movement as an element, but not the most compelling one, in creating global governance" and noting
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Benedict Kingsbury, and Kal Raustiala.). See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury et al.,
The Emergence of GlobalAdministrative Law (N.Y. Univ. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Papers,
Paper 17, 2005), http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/plltwp/papers/17/.
105. SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (James Stachey trans., W.W. Norton &
Co. 2005) (1930).
106. Cf. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 157 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002)
(1761) ("[I]f [a man] would lose his little finger to-morrow, he would not sleep to-night; but, pro-
vided he never saw them, he will snore with the most profound security over the ruin of a hundred
millions of his brethren[.]").
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are predisposed to see more of them in our own time. We risk overstating the
gravity of the moment, at every moment.
And I think, in some general but structural way, global governance reinforces
this all-too-human tendency to overvalue the present, proximate, and novel; not
only by its focus on change insufficiently tempered by longitudinal perspective," 7
but also by encouraging an inaccurately monolithic image of the prior system,
which in turn amplifies the sense that recent changes profoundly diverge from
that system. In the worst and weakest instances, this monolithism creates a straw
Westphalia against which the rise of the internet, NGOs, and global capital read
as qualitatively more radical than they are, and thereby invoke a spurious global-
ism. '° But even in the best and most sober work, there is a risk of perspectival
bias, if only arising from what is not written.
This dynamic may operate both within the broader definitional structure of
global governance and, more narrowly, in encouraging confidence in the narra-
tive claim that present scholarship has distanced itself from the more problematic
researches of the 19 90s. Despite its workman-like, technical quality, current schol-
arship in global governance may be profoundly marked by its own historically
situated concepts-in particular in the very act of deciding what constitutes the
proper object of study.
It is in this overvaluation of present change and undervaluation of temporal
context that global governance exhibits a problematic susceptibility to fashion.
Fashion, after all, is a disabling of longer-term temporal perspective-a collective
enthusiasm by which we assign greater present value to a thing than, over time,
we otherwise might. (Fashions in clothing, for example, change dramatically
from year to year, yet dress codes exhibit considerably more stability over time;
hems rise and fall, lapels widen and narrow, yet gender-differentiated clothing
norms can be quite conservative.) The academic and policy realms are not im-
mune to fashions.0 9 The puzzle, of course, is that significant shifts- like the
spread of Western dress or the rise of international organizations-are, of neces-
107. Cf Anderson, supra note 49 (periodizing global governance in ever shorter segments: up to
1989, 1945-1989, 1989-1996, 1996-2000, 1999-2000, and "9/11 and the Iraq war.").
108. Cf McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 12, at 3 (stating that "[elffective, comprehensive uni-
versality, despite the faint shadows of worldwide organization, does not now exist" and criticizing
"the invocation of spurious universalism").
109. One example that straddles the worlds of academia and policy is the oft-noted tendency of
aid and development agencies-including both NGOs and "beltway bandits"-to package what-
ever work they are doing as, say "rule of law" or "promotion of local ownership" in response to
shifting fashion and funding priorities.
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sity, expressed through the Brownian motion of emphemeral trends, and the trick
is to discern when something is just the one, and when it is both.
I do not wish to overstate the link between global governance's perspectival
commitments to change and its present fashionability. After all, it is entirely pos-
sible for academic disciplines to adopt static methodologies, 0 while temporary
enthusiasms can also develop for permanent truths, as the periodic resurgence of
religious sentiment or the historical determinism underpinning Marxism"' dem-
onstrate. And of course, some things are fashionable-popular-for good reason.
But this prompts me to suggest-in a purely speculative and general way-one
further concern with global governance.
Some conceptual paradigms persist because they are powerfully generative of
new, useful and persuasive thinking. Darwinian evolution, for example, contin-
ues to dominate our understanding of biology and fields beyond, largely due to its
rigorous yet capacious explanatory power. Global governance, I fear, exhibits more
capacity than rigor. Its popularity as an organizing concept derives more from its
open, undefined, relatively content-free frame-its tendency to default towards
the broad, ecumenical end of"governance"-and from the insights it allows rather
than generates."2 Global governance is less an intellectual engine than an aggrega-
tor; almost anything could plausibly be described as global governance, and in this
it represents more a sensibility than a true discipline." 3
These are, admittedly, vast generalizations. I am surely guilty of excessive for-
110. At various times, history has adopted Braudelian longue duree perspectives, and classical eco-
nomics was long focused on parsimonious, predictive theories, while the realist, statist international
relations that much global governance is developed against were, to a large extent, attempts to develop
theoretical models based on static elements. And of course the hard sciences are often expressly ori-
ented towards discerning "laws."
111. Global governance's change narrative carries echoes of that tenet of Marxism according to
which the state would wither away. That was wrong, but what was interesting was what it said about
the project's millennial qualities and its inattention to the possibility of sticky elements in the global
order. Is it possible that global governance-though much more sober and technical, and not a fash-
ion only of the left-is the latest incarnation of this intellectual tendency? It would certainly be worth
inquiring into the genealogical links between current global governance study and previous scholarly
or political projects that envisioned a radical shift in the state-centered system; global governance may
share common perspectives with world government enthusiasms of the interwar and early postwar
periods. See World Government, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (rev. ed. 2006), http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/world-government/; see also DEREK B. HEATER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIT-
IZENSHIP 105-12 (2004) (on world citizenship).
112. A more positive way to frame this would be that global governance is a liberating perspective,
freeing us from the artificial strictures of statist theory.
113. Cf Dingwerth & Pattberg, supra note 8, at 186 (describing a "global governance perspective").
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malism; I certainly have taken the liberty of describing global governance theory
and its definition almost as if these were Platonic entities, rather than distillations of
countless scholars' efforts, and even though the communities interested in global
governance are no better defined than the concept itself. So, I have set up my own
little straw man. But if I am right that there is little uniting global governance as a
field than a focus on change and an inclination to reject the narrow statism of classi-
cal international relations, what greater specificity could one possibly achieve? What
could one say in praise or criticism of global governance as a field that would not
merit immediate and justifiable objection for essentializing and ignoring complex
sub-streams of scholarship? This immunity to generalization suggests something
about the concept's coherence, and consequently, perhaps, its contribution. Global
governance may simply encompass too much, and the risk in a Theory of Every-
thing is that it does not actually explain much of anything."4
Perhaps you are thinking, "What a Luddite!" I do not think so. Much as I find
the eternal verities compelling, I personally prefer the idea of living in exciting times.
I understand the attraction of discovering that the world is changing profoundly
and having a theory to explain it, as well as the urge to align one's interpretation
with one's preferences. It is hard not to get swept up in the heady prospect of wit-
nessing (even contributing to?) a world-historical shift in the organization of the
planet. That does not necessarily make it true, of course. Or false: the effervescent
quality of some global governance does not mean there is nothing going on. There
are real changes in the way we view legal regulation"' and individual participa-
tion."16 Even fashions and bubbles can be harbingers of real change; there is a lucra-
114. Cf. Dingwerth & Pattberg, supra note 8, at 187 ("[T]he rather careless use of the term global
governance has contributed to rendering the academic discourse as confusing as it is and to pro-
foundly limiting the cumulativeness of research findings."). Again, none of this is an attack on the
extraordinary insights that individual scholars achieve. I intend a critique of the underlying structure,
not of any individual work, any one of which might be-so many of which unquestionably are-
rigorous and valuable. Indeed, it follows from my critique that global governance as a construct, apart
from its distorting potential, may contribute so little to inquiry that we would not expect it to greatly
deflect the work of an otherwise competent researcher.
115. See Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Di-
versification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).
116. See generally Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. I. INT'L
L. 46 (1992); Martin 0. Heisler, Introduction- Changing Citizenship Theory and Practice: Comparative
Perspectives in a Democratic Framework, 38 POL. ScI. & POL. 667 (2005); Will Kymlicka & Wayne Nor-
man, Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHICS 352 (1994).
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tive (globalized) tulip industry, even though at times in history, tulips were a
colossally bad investment."7 So too, perhaps, will it prove with global governance.
Denying change is not one of my projects, but neither is preferring (or oppos-
ing) disaggregated, globalized decision making for its own sake; my skepticism is
interpretative, not political."8 What global governance as a discipline needs is more
balanced inquiry into change and continuity" 9-and with it, perhaps, an even more
rigorous and sober sense of its own location in the long stream. The next time you
are at a conference on global governance-and they occur quite often-if you hear
someone declare the state "still relevant" or invoke "new modes of transnational citi-
zenship," ask yourself how it will sound in ten years' time. How do you look in
photographs from ten years ago? Because you know, fashion is a fickle thing.
Of course, maybe I will be the one who is embarrassed. Maybe in 2058, I will be
boarding my flight to the annual World Governance Forum at Davos-sur-Mer-
this year's theme is "Remembering the Passport," and ever since my seminal 2010
117. MIKE DASH, TULIPOMANIA: THE STORY OF THE WORLD'S MOST COVETED FLOWER AND THE
EXTRAORDINARY PASSIONS IT AROUSED 162-74 (1999); CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPU-
LAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS (Crown Trade Paperbacks 1980) (1841).
118. 1 have made these arguments without reference to whether or not the changes collectively iden-
tified as global governance are a good thing or not, in normative terms. I wish to avoid that substantive
thicket. Anyone familiar with my writing would know I am not a state sovereigntist-at least, I do not
take existing states for granted. See, e.g., Timothy William Waters, The Blessing of Departure: Accept-
able and Unacceptable State Support for Demographic Transformation, 2 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 221
(2008) (discussing the normative acceptability of secession and self-determination).
119. There are authors directly engaging this question. See KALEVI J. HOLSTi, TAMING THE SOVER-
EIGNS: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (2004); G. John Ikenberry, Taming the
Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 166, 166
(reviewing Holsti's book and stating that "[fOrom [Holsti's] baseline conception of a 'society of states'
in which relations are regulated by Westphalian norms and institutions, he finds continuity and creep-
ing complexity more than a sharp transformation toward a de-territorialized, borderless world."); see
also Raustiala,supra note 67 (2003) (critiquing mainstream global governance theory's belief that state
sovereignty is weakened by international institutions).
Other forms of balancing strike me as problematic. Cf JAMES N. ROSENAU, TURBULENCE IN
WORLD POLITICS: A THEORY OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY (1990). Rosenau's continuity-which in-
cludes locating present trends in accelerating stages of human evolutionary capacity-is a curious
amalgam of an ultralongue durie and millennial optimism. See James N. Rosenau, Citizenship in a
Changing Global Order, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENTsupra note 71, at 272,278-79.1 imag-
ine a different balance, and one could do worse than draw initial, non-academic inspiration from an
early, but profoundly ecological statement about the dynamic relationship of change and continuity -
Ecclesiastes 1: 6-7, 9 (King James): "The wind goeth toward the south, and turneth about unto the
north; it whirleth about continually, and the wind returneth again according to his circuits./ All the
rivers run into the sea; yet the sea is not full; unto the place from whence the rivers come, thither they
return again. / ... The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that
which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun."
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article on the subject, I have been recognized as an indispensable if somewhat unre-
liable expert (though if you want to know the truth, I am going because I have never
been to the Helvetic Archipelago before, and I am really looking forward to it). I
will be delivering my paper entitled "Looking Back Fifty Years, I Couldn't Have
Been More Mistaken." Maybe; I certainly would not mind being around long
enough to be wrong. But here is another prediction: Even if that happens, at the
conference there will be some other idea that is fashionable. There always is.
